We identify a trade-off between robustness and accuracy that serves as a guiding principle in the design of defenses against adversarial examples. Although the problem has been widely studied empirically, much remains unknown concerning the theory underlying this trade-off. In this work, we quantify the trade-off in terms of the gap between the risk for adversarial examples and the risk for non-adversarial examples. The challenge is to provide tight bounds on this quantity in terms of a surrogate loss. We give an optimal upper bound on this quantity in terms of classification-calibrated loss, which matches the lower bound in the worst case. Inspired by our theoretical analysis, we also design a new defense method, TRADES, to trade adversarial robustness off against accuracy. Our proposed algorithm performs well experimentally in real-world datasets. The methodology is the foundation of our entry to the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge in which we won the 1st place out of 1,995 submissions in the robust model track, surpassing the runner-up approach by 11.41% in terms of mean 2 perturbation distance.
Introduction
In response to the vulnerability of deep neural networks to small perturbations around input data [SZS + 13], adversarial defenses have been an imperative object of study in machine learning [HPG + 17], computer vision [SKN + 18, XWZ + 17, MC17] , natural language processing [JL17] , and many other domains. In machine learning, study of adversarial defenses has led to significant advances in understanding and defending against adversarial threat [HWC + 17]. In computer vision and natural language processing, adversarial defenses serve as indispensable building blocks for a range of security-critical systems and applications, such as autonomous cars and speech recognition authorization. The problem of adversarial defenses can be stated as that of learning a classifier with high test accuracy on both natural and adversarial examples. The adversarial example for a given labeled data (x, y) is a data point x that causes a classifier c to output a different label on x than y, but is "imperceptibly similar" to x. Given the difficulty of providing an operational definition of "imperceptible similarity," adversarial examples typically come in the form of restricted attacks such as -bounded perturbations [SZS + 13], or unrestricted attacks such as adversarial rotations, translations, and deformations [BCZ + 18, ETT + 17, GAG + 18, XZL + 18, AAG19, ZCS + 19]. The focus of this work is the former setting.
Despite a large literature devoted to improving the robustness of deep-learning models, many fundamental questions remain unresolved. One of the most important questions is how to trade off adversarial robustness The problem of adversarial defense becomes more challenging when considering computational issues. This is due to the fact that direct formulations of robust-classification problems involves minimizing the robust 0-1 loss max
a loss which is NP-hard to optimize [GR09] . This is why progress on algorithms that focus on accuracy have built on minimum contrast methods that minimize a surrogate of the 0-1 loss function [BJM06] , e.g., the hinge loss or cross-entropy loss. While prior work on adversarial defense replaced the 0-1 loss 1(·) in Eqn.
(1) with a surrogate loss to defend against adversarial threat [MMS + 18, KGB17, UOKvdO18] , this line of research may suffer from loose surrogate approximation to the 0-1 loss. It may thus result in degraded performance.
Our methodology and results
We begin with an illustrative example that illustrates the trade-off between accuracy and adversarial robustness, a phenomenon which has been demonstrated by [TSE + 19], but without theoretical guarantees. We demonstrate that the minimal risk is achieved by a classifier with 100% accuracy on the non-adversarial examples. We refer to this accuracy as the natural accuracy and we similarly refer to the natural error or natural risk. In this same example, the accuracy to the adversarial examples, which we refer to as the robust accuracy, is as small as 0% (see Table 1 ). This motivates us to quantify the trade-off by the gap between optimal natural error and the robust error. Note that the latter is an adversarial counterpart of the former which allows a bounded worst-case perturbation before feeding the perturbed sample to the classifier. We study this gap in the context of a differentiable surrogate loss. We show that surrogate loss minimization suffices to derive a classifier with guaranteed robustness and accuracy. Our theoretical analysis naturally leads to a new formulation of adversarial defense which has several appealing properties; in particular, it inherits the benefits of scalability to large datasets exhibited by Tiny ImageNet, and the algorithm achieves state-of-the-art performance on a range of benchmarks while providing theoretical guarantees. For example, while the defenses overviewed in [ACW18] achieve robust accuracy no higher than~47% under white-box attacks, our method achieves robust accuracy as high as~57% in the same setting. The methodology is the foundation of our entry to the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge where we won first place out of 1,995 submissions, surpassing the runner-up approach by 11.41% in terms of mean 2 perturbation distance.
Summary of contributions
Our work tackles the problem of trading accuracy off against robustness and advances the state-of-the-art in multiple ways.
• Theoretically, we characterize the trade-off between accuracy and robustness for classification problems via the gap between robust error and optimal natural error. We provide an upper bound for this gap in terms of surrogate loss. The bound is optimal as it matches the lower bound in the worst-case scenario.
• Algorithmically, inspired by our theoretical analysis, we propose a new formulation of adversarial defense, TRADES, as optimizing a regularized surrogate loss. The loss consists of two terms: the term of empirical risk minimization encourages the algorithm to maximize the natural accuracy, while the regularization term encourages the algorithm to push the decision boundary away from the data, so as to improve adversarial robustness (see Figure 1 ).
• Experimentally, we show that our proposed algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art methods under both black-box and white-box threat models. In particular, the methodology won the final round of the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge.
Preliminaries
Before proceeding, we define some notation and clarify our problem setup.
Notations
We will use bold capital letters such as X and Y to represent random vector, bold lower-case letters such as x and y to represent realization of random vector, capital letters such as X and Y to represent random variable, and lower-case letters such as x and y to represent realization of random variable. Specifically, we denote by x ∈ X the sample instance, and by y ∈ {−1, +1} the label, where X ⊆ R d indicates the instance space. sign(x) represents the sign of scalar x with sign(0) = +1. Denote by f : X → R the score function which maps an instance to a confidence value associated with being positive. It can be parametrized, e.g., by deep neural networks. The associated binary classifier is sign(f (·)). We will frequently use 1{event}, the 0-1 loss, to represent an indicator function that is 1 if an event happens and 0 otherwise. For norms, we denote by x a generic norm. Examples of norms include x ∞ , the infinity norm of vector x, and x 2 , the 2 norm of vector x. We use B(x, ) to represent a neighborhood of x: {x ∈ X :
x − x ≤ }. For a given score function f , we denote by DB(f ) the decision boundary of f ; that is, the set {x ∈ X : f (x) = 0}. B(DB(f ), ) indicates the neighborhood of the decision boundary of f :
For a given function ψ(u), we denote by ψ * (v) := sup u {u T v − ψ(u)} the conjugate function of ψ, by ψ * * the bi-conjugate, and by ψ −1 the inverse function. We will frequently use φ(·) to indicate the surrogate of 0-1 loss.
Robust (classification) error
In the setting of adversarial learning, we are given a set of instances x 1 , ..., x n ∈ X and labels y 1 , ..., y n ∈ {−1, +1}. We assume that the data are sampled from an unknown distribution (X, Y ) ∼ D. To characterize 
This is in sharp contrast to the standard measure of classifier performance-the natural (classification) error
We note that the two errors satisfy R rob (f ) ≥ R nat (f ) for all f ; the robust error is equal to the natural error when = 0.
Trade-off between natural and robust errors
Our study is motivated by the trade-off between natural and robust errors. [TSE + 19] showed that training robust models may lead to a reduction of standard accuracy. To illustrate the phenomenon, we provide a toy example here.
Example. Consider the case (X, Y ) ∼ D, where the marginal distribution over the instance space is a uniform distribution over [0, 1], and for k = 0, 1, ..., 1 2 − 1 ,
(2) See Figure 2 for the visualization of η(x). We consider two classifiers: a) the Bayes optimal classifier sign(2η(x) − 1); b) the all-one classifier which always outputs "positive." Table 1 displays the trade-off between natural and robust errors: the minimal natural error is achieved by the Bayes optimal classifier with large robust error, while the optimal robust error is achieved by the all-one classifier with large natural error. Despite a large literature on the analysis of robust error in terms of generalization [SST + 18, CBM18, YRB18] and computational complexity [BPR18, BLPR18] , the trade-off between the natural error and the robust error has not been a focus of theoretical study.
Our goal. To characterize the trade-off, we aim at approximately solving a constrained problem for a score function f with guarantee R rob ( f ) ≤ OPT + δ, given a precision parameter δ > 0:
OPT
where R * nat represents the risk of the Bayes optimal classifier, the classifier with the minimal natural error. We note that it suffices to show Table 1 : Comparisons of natural and robust errors of Bayes optimal classifier and all-one classifier in example (2). The Bayes optimal classifier has the optimal natural error while the all-one classifier has the optimal robust error. Bayes Optimal Classifier All-One Classifier R nat 0 (optimal) 1/2 R rob 1 1/2 (optimal)
In this paper, our principal goal is to provide a tight bound on R rob (f ) − R * nat , using a regularized surrogate loss which can be optimized easily.
Classification-calibrated surrogate loss
Definition. Minimization of the 0-1 loss in the natural and robust errors is computationally intractable and the demands of computational efficiency have led researchers to focus on minimization of a tractable surrogate loss,
We then need to find quantitative relationships between the excess errors associated with φ and those associated with 0-1 loss. We make a weak assumption on φ: it is classification-calibrated [BJM06] . Formally, for η ∈ [0, 1], define the conditional φ-risk by
and define H − (η) := inf α(2η−1)≤0 C η (α). The classification-calibrated condition requires that imposing the constraint that α has an inconsistent sign with the Bayes decision rule sign(2η − 1) leads to a strictly larger φ-risk:
Assumption 1 (Classification-Calibrated Loss). We assume that the surrogate loss φ is classification-calibrated, meaning that for any η = 1/2, H − (η) > H(η).
We argue that Assumption 1 is indispensable for classification problems, since without it the Bayes optimal classifier cannot be the minimizer of the φ-risk. Examples of classification-calibrated loss include hinge loss, sigmoid loss, exponential loss, logistic loss, and many others (see Table 2 ).
Properties. Classification-calibrated loss has many structural properties that one can exploit. We begin by introducing a functional transform of classification-calibrated loss φ which was proposed by [BJM06] . Define the function ψ : Below we state useful properties of the ψ-transform. We will frequently use the function ψ to bound
). Under Assumption 1, the function ψ has the following properties: ψ is non-decreasing, continuous, convex on [0, 1] and ψ(0) = 0.
Relating 0-1 Error to Surrogate Loss
In this section, we present our main theoretical contributions for binary classification and compare our results with prior literature. Binary classification problems have received significant attention in recent years as many competitions evaluate the performance of robust models on binary classification problems [BCZ + 18]. We defer the discussions for multi-class problems to Section 4. 
Upper bound
Our analysis leads to the following guarantee on the performance of surrogate loss minimization.
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption 1, for any non-negative loss function φ such that φ(0) ≥ 1, any measurable f : X → R, any probability distribution on X × {±1}, and any λ > 0, we have 1
Quantity governing model robustness. Our result provides a formal justification for the existence of adversarial examples: learning models are brittle to small adversarial attacks because the probability that data lie around the decision boundary of the model, Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f ), ), c 0 (X) = Y ], is large. As a result, small perturbations may move the data point to the wrong side of the decision boundary, leading to weak robustness of classification models.
Lower bound
We now establish a lower bound on R rob (f ) − R * nat . Our lower bound matches our analysis of the upper bound in Section 3.1 up to an arbitrarily small constant. 
Theorem 3.2 demonstrates that in the presence of extra conditions on the loss function, i.e., lim x→+∞ φ(x) = 0, the upper bound in Section 3.1 is tight. The condition holds for all the losses in Table 2 .
Algorithmic Design for Adversarial Defenses
Optimization. Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 shed light on algorithmic designs of adversarial defenses. In order to minimize R rob (f ) − R * nat , the theorems suggest minimizing 2
We name our method TRADES (TRadeoff-inspired Adversarial DEfense via Surrogate-loss minimization).
Intuition behind the optimization. Problem (3) captures the trade-off between the natural and robust errors: the first term in (3) encourages the natural error to be optimized by minimizing the "difference" between f (X) and Y , while the second regularization term encourages the output to be smooth, that is, it pushes the decision boundary of classifier away from the sample instances via minimizing the "difference" between the prediction of natural example f (X) and that of adversarial example f (X ). This is conceptually consistent with the argument that smoothness is an indispensable property of robust models [CBG + 17]. The tuning parameter λ plays a critical role on balancing the importance of natural and robust errors. To see how the hyperparameter λ affects the solution in the example of Section 2.3, problem (3) tends to the Bayes optimal classifier when λ → +∞, and tends to the all-one classifier when λ → 0.
Comparisons with prior works. We compare our approach with several related lines of research in the prior literature. One of the best known algorithms for adversarial defense is based on robust optimization [MMS + 18, KW18, WSMK18, RSL18a, RSL18b]. Most results in this direction involve algorithms that approximately minimize
where the objective function in problem (4) serves as an upper bound of the robust error R rob (f ). In complex problem domains, however, this objective function might not be tight as an upper bound of robust error, and may not capture the trade-off between natural and robust errors. A related line of research is adversarial training by regularization [KGB17, RDV17, ZSLG16]. There are several key differences between the results in this paper and those of [KGB17, RDV17, ZSLG16]. Firstly, the optimization formulations are different. In the previous works, the regularization term either measures the "difference" between f (X ) and Y [KGB17], or its gradient [RDV17]. In contrast, our regularization term measures the "difference" between f (X) and f (X ). While [ZSLG16] generated the adversarial example X by adding random Gaussian noise to X, our method simulates the adversarial example by solving the inner maximization problem in Eqn. (3). Secondly, we note that the losses in [KGB17, RDV17, ZSLG16] lack of theoretical guarantees. Our loss, with the presence of the second term in problem (3), makes our theoretical analysis significantly more subtle. Moreover, our algorithm takes the same computational resources as adversasrial training at scale [KGB17] , which makes our method scalable to large-scale datasets. We defer the experimental comparisons of various regularization based methods to Table 5 .
Heuristic algorithm. In response to the optimization formulation (3), we use two heuristics to achieve more general defenses: a) extending to multi-class problems by involving multi-class calibrated loss; b) approximately solving the minimax problem via alternating gradient descent. For multi-class problems, a surrogate loss is calibrated if minimizers of the surrogate risk are also minimizers of the 0-1 risk [PS16]. Examples of Algorithm 1 Adversarial training by TRADES 1: Input:
Step sizes η 1 and η 2 , batch size m, number of iterations K in inner optimization, network architecture parametrized by θ 2: Output: Robust network f θ 3: Randomly initialize network f θ , or initialize network with pre-trained configuration 4: repeat 5:
Read mini-batch B = {x 1 , ..., x m } from training set 6:
for i = 1, ..., m (in parallel) do 7:
where N (0, I) is the Gaussian distribution with zero mean and identity variance 8:
for k = 1, ..., K do 9: 
until training converged multi-class calibrated loss include cross-entropy loss. Algorithmically, we extend problem (3) to the case of multi-class classifications by replacing φ with a multi-class calibrated loss L(·, ·):
where f (X) is the output vector of learning model (with softmax operator in the top layer for the cross-entropy loss L(·, ·)), Y is the label-indicator vector, and λ > 0 is the regularization parameter. The pseudocode of adversarial training procedure, which aims at minimizing the empirical form of problem (5), is displayed in Algorithm 1.
The key ingredient of the algorithm is to approximately solve the linearization of inner maximization in problem (5) by the projected gradient descent (see Step 7). We note that x i is a global minimizer with zero gradient to the objective function g(x ) := L(f (x i ), f (x )) in the inner problem. Therefore, we initialize x i by adding a small, random perturbation around x i in Step 5 to start the inner optimizer. More exhaustive approximations of the inner maximization problem in terms of either optimization formulations or solvers would lead to better defense performance.
Experimental Results
In this section, we verify the effectiveness of TRADES by numerical experiments. We denote by A rob (f ) := 1 − R rob (f ) the robust accuracy, and by A nat (f ) := 1 − R nat (f ) the natural accuracy on test dataset. The pixels of input images are normalized to [0, 1]. We release our PyTorch code at https://github.com/ yaodongyu/TRADES.
Optimality of Theorem 3.1
We verify the tightness of the established upper bound in Theorem 3.1 for binary classification problem on MNIST dataset. The negative examples are '1' and the positive examples are '3'. Here we use a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) with two convolutional layers, followed by two fully-connected layers. The output size of the last layer is 1. To learn the robust classifier, we minimize the regularized surrogate loss in Eqn. (3), and use the hinge loss in Table 2 as the surrogate loss φ, where the associated ψ-transform is ψ(θ) = θ. To verify the tightness of our upper bound, we calculate the left hand side in Theorem 3.1, i.e.,
and the right hand side, i.e.,
As we cannot have access to the unknown distribution D, we approximate the above expectation terms by test dataset. We first use natural training method to train a classifier so as to approximately estimate R * nat and R * φ , where we find that the naturally trained classifier can achieve natural error R * nat = 0%, and loss value R * φ = 0.0 for the binary classification problem. Next, we optimize problem (3) to train a robust classifier f . We take perturbation = 0.1, number of iterations K = 20 and run 30 epochs on the training dataset. Finally, to approximate the second term in ∆ RHS , we use FGSM k (white-box) attack (a.k.a. PGD attack) [KGB17] with 20 iterations to approximately calculate the worst-case perturbed data X .
The results in Table 3 show the tightness of our upper bound in Theorem 3.1. It shows that the differences between ∆ RHS and ∆ LHS under various λ's are very small.
Sensitivity of regularization hyperparameter λ
The regularization parameter λ is an important hyperparameter in our proposed method. We show how the regularization parameter affects the performance of our robust classifiers by numerical experiments on two datasets, MNIST and CIFAR10. For both datasets, we minimize the loss in Eqn. (5) to learn robust classifiers for multi-class problems, where we choose L as the cross-entropy loss.
MNIST setup. We use the CNN which has two convolutional layers, followed by two fully-connected layers. The output size of the last layer is 10. We set perturbation = 0.1, perturbation step size η 1 = 0.01, number of iterations K = 20, learning rate η 2 = 0.01, batch size m = 128, and run 50 epochs on the training dataset. 
To evaluate the robust error, we apply FGSM k (white-box) attack with 40 iterations and 0.005 step size. The results are in Table 4 .
CIFAR10 setup. We apply ResNet-18 [HZRS16] for classification. The output size of the last layer is 10. We set perturbation = 0.031, perturbation step size η 1 = 0.007, number of iterations K = 10, learning rate η 2 = 0.1, batch size m = 128, and run 100 epochs on the training dataset. To evaluate the robust error, we apply FGSM k (white-box) attack with 20 iterations and the step size is 0.003. The results are in Table 4 . We observe that as the regularization parameter 1/λ increases, the natural accuracy A nat (f ) decreases while the robust accuracy A rob (f ) increases, which verifies our theory on the trade-off between robustness and accuracy. Note that for MNIST dataset, the natural accuracy does not decrease too much as the regularization term 1/λ increases, which is different from the results of CIFAR10. This is probably because the classification task for MNIST is easier. Meanwhile, our proposed method is not very sensitive to the choice of λ. Empirically, when we set the hyperparameter 1/λ in [1, 10], our method is able to learn classifiers with both high robustness and high accuracy.
Adversarial defenses under various attacks
Previously, [ACW18] showed that 7 defenses in ICLR 2018 which relied on obfuscated gradients may easily break down. In this section, we verify the effectiveness of our method with the same experimental setup under both white-box and black-box threat models. MNIST setup. We use the CNN architecture in [CW17] with four convolutional layers, followed by three fully-connected layers. We set perturbation = 0.3, perturbation step size η 1 = 0.01, number of iterations K = 40, learning rate η 2 = 0.01, batch size m = 128, and run 100 epochs on the training dataset.
CIFAR10 setup. We use the same neural network architecture as [MMS + 18], i.e., the wide residual network WRN-34-10 [ZK16]. We set perturbation = 0.031, perturbation step size η 1 = 0.007, number of iterations K = 10, learning rate η 2 = 0.1, batch size m = 128, and run 100 epochs on the training dataset.
White-box attacks
We summarize our results in Table 5 together with the results from [ACW18] . We also implement methods in [ZSLG16, KGB17, RDV17] on the CIFAR10 dataset as they are also regularization based methods. For MNIST dataset, we apply FGSM k (white-box) attack with 40 iterations and the step size is 0.01. For CIFAR10 dataset, we apply FGSM k (white-box) attack with 20 iterations and the step size is 0.003, under which the defense model in [MMS + 18] achieves 47.04% robust accuracy. Table 5 shows that our proposed defense method can significantly improve the robust accuracy of models, which is able to achieve robust accuracy as high as 56.61%. We also evaluate our robust model on MNIST dataset under the same threat model as in [SKC18] (C&W white-box attack [CW17] ), and the robust accuracy is 99.46%. See appendix for detailed information of models in Table 5 .
Black-box attacks
We verify the robustness of our models under black-box attacks. We first train models without using adversarial training on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. We use the same network architectures that are specified in the beginning of this section, i.e., the CNN architecture in [CW17] and the WRN-34-10 architecture in [ZK16]. We denote these models by naturally trained models (Natural . The vertical axis represents the mean 2 perturbation distance that makes robust models fail to output correct labels.
For both datasets, we use FGSM k (black-box) method to attack various defense models. For MNIST dataset, we set perturbation = 0.3 and apply FGSM k (black-box) attack with 40 iterations and the step size is 0.01. For CIFAR10 dataset, we set = 0.031 and apply FGSM k (black-box) attack with 20 iterations and the step size is 0.003. Note that the setup is the same as the setup specified in Section 5.3.1. We summarize our results in Table 6 and Table 7 . In both tables, we use two source models (noted in the parentheses) to generate adversarial perturbations: we compute the perturbation directions according to the gradients of the source models on the input images. It shows that our models are more robust against black-box attacks transfered from naturally trained models and [MMS + 18]'s models. Moreover, our models can generate stronger adversarial examples for black-box attacks compared with naturally trained models and [MMS + 18]'s models.
Case study: NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge
Competition settings. In the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge [BRK + 18], the adversarial attacks and defenses are under the black-box setting. The dataset in this challenge is Tiny ImageNet, which consists of 550,000 data (with our data augmentation) and 200 classes. The robust models only return label predictions instead of explicit gradients and confidence scores. The task for robust models is to defend against adversarial examples that are generated by the top-5 submissions in the un-targeted attack track. The score for each defense model is evaluated by the smallest perturbation distance that makes the defense model fail to output correct labels.
Competition results. The methodology in this paper was applied to the competition, where our entry ranked the 1st place in the robust model track. We implemented our method to train ResNet models. We report the mean 2 perturbation distance of the top-6 entries in Figure 3 . It shows that our method outperforms other approaches with a large margin. In particular, we surpass the runner-up submission by 11.41% in terms of mean 2 perturbation distance.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study the problem of adversarial defenses against structural perturbations around input data. We focus on the trade-off between robustness and accuracy, and show an upper bound on the gap between robust error and optimal natural error. Our result advances the state-of-the-art work and matches the lower bound in the worst-case scenario. ZSS18] , they are brittle to adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks have been extensively studied in the recent years. One of the baseline attacks to deep nerual networks is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [GSS15] . FGSM computes an adversarial example as
where x is the input instance, y is the label, f : X → R is the score function (parametrized by deep nerual network for example) which maps an instance to its confidence value of being positive, and φ(·) is a surrogate of 0-1 loss. A more powerful yet natural extension of FGSM is the multi-step variant FGSM k (also known as PGD attack) [KGB17] . FGSM k applies projected gradient descent by k times: 
Following this framework, [HXSS15, SYN15] considered one-step adversaries, while [MMS + 18] worked with multi-step methods for the inner maximization problem. There are, however, two critical differences between the robust optimization based defenses and the present paper. Firstly, robust optimization based defenses lack of theoretical guarantees. Secondly, such methods do not consider the trade-off between accuracy and robustness.
Relaxation based defenses. We mention another related line of research in adversarial defenses-relaxation based defenses. Given that the inner maximization in problem (6) 
B Proofs of Main Results
In this section, we provide the proofs of our main results.
B.1 Proofs of Theorem 3.1
We denote by f * (·) := 2η(·) − 1 the Bayes decision rule throughout the proofs.
For any classifier f , we have
Proof. For any classifier f , we have We have
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1 (restated). Under Assumption 1, for any non-negative loss function φ such that φ(0) ≥ 1, any measurable f : X → R, any probability distribution on X × {±1}, and any λ > 0, we have
where R * φ := min f R φ (f ) and c 0 (·) = sign(2η(·) − 1) is the Bayes optimal classifier.
Proof. By Lemma B.1, we note that
Also, notice that 
Proof. The first inequality follows from Theorem 3.1. Thus it suffices to prove the second inequality. Fix > 0 and θ ∈ [0, 1]. By the definition of ψ and its continuity, we can choose γ, α 1 , α 2 ∈ [0, 1] such that θ = γα 1 + (1 − γ)α 2 and ψ(θ) ≥ γψ(α 1 ) + (1 − γ)ψ(α 2 ) − /3. For two distinct points x 1 , x 2 ∈ X , we set P X such that Pr[X = x 1 ] = γ, Pr[X = x 2 ] = 1 − γ, η(x 1 ) = (1 + α 1 )/2, and η(x 2 ) = (1 + α 2 )/2. By the definition of H − , we choose function f : R d → R such that f (x) < 0 for all x ∈ X , C η(x 1 ) (f (x 1 )) ≤ H − (η(x 1 )) + /3, and C η(x 2 ) (f (x 2 )) ≤ H − (η(x 2 )) + /3. By the continuity of ψ, there is an > 0 such that ψ(θ) ≤ ψ(θ − 0 ) + /3 for all 0 ≤ 0 < . We also note that there exists an λ 0 > 0 such that for any 0 < λ < λ 0 , we have
Thus, we have
Furthermore, by Lemma B.1,
where f * is the Bayes optimal classifier which outputs "positive" for all data points.
C Extra Theoretical Results
In this section, we provide extra theoretical results for adversarial defenses.
C.1 Adversarial vulnerability under log-concave distributions
Theorem 3.1 states that for any classifier f , the value Pr[X ∈ B(DB(f ), )] characterizes the robustness of the classifier. In this section, we show that among all classifiers such that Pr[sign(f (X)) = +1] = 1/2, linear classifier minimizes
provided that the marginal distribution over X is products of log-concave measures. A measure is log-concave if the logarithm of its density is a concave function. The class of log-concave measures contains many well-known (classes of) distributions as special cases, such as Gaussian and uniform measure over ball. Our results are inspired by the isoperimetric inequality of log-concave distributions by the work of [Bar01] . Intuitively, the isoperimetric problem consists in finding subsets of prescribed measure, such that its measure increases the less under enlargement. Our analysis leads to the following guarantee on the quantity (7). The isoperimetric function is
Before proceeding, we cite the following results from [Bar01] . Proof. We note that
To apply Lemma C.2, we set the A in Lemma C.2 as the event {sign(f (X)) = +1}. Therefore, the set
, sign(f (X)) = −1}. 
C.2 Margin based generalization bounds
Before proceeding, we first cite a useful lemma. We say that function f 1 : R → R and f 2 : R → R have a γ separator if there exists a function f 3 :
For any given function f 1 and γ > 0, one can always construct f 2 and f 3 such that f 1 and f 2 have a γ-separator f 3 by setting f 2 (h) = sup |h−h |≤2γ f 1 (h ) and f 3 (h) = sup |h−h |≤γ f 1 (h ).
Lemma C.3 (Corollary 1, [Zha02] ). Let f 1 be a function R → R. Consider a family of functions f γ 2 : R → R, parametrized by γ, such that 0 ≤ f 1 ≤ f γ 2 ≤ 1. Assume that for all γ, f 1 and f γ 2 has a γ separator. Assume also that f γ 2 (z) ≥ f γ 2 (z) when γ ≥ γ . Let γ 1 > γ 2 > ... be a decreasing sequence of parameters, and p i be a sequence of positive numbers such that ∞ i=1 p i = 1, then for all η > 0, with probability of at least 1 − δ over data:
for all w and γ, where for each fixed γ, we use i to denote the smallest index such that γ i ≤ γ.
Lemma C.4 (Theorem 4, [Zha02]). If x p ≤ b and w q ≤ a, where 2 ≤ p < ∞ and 1/p + 1/q = 1, then ∀γ > 0,
Theorem C.5. Suppose that the data is 2-norm bounded by x 2 ≤ b. Consider the family Γ of linear classifier
Then with probability at least 1 − δ over n random samples (x i , y i ) ∼ D, for all margin width γ > 0 and w ∈ Γ, we have
Proof. The theorem is a straightforward result of Lemmas C.3 and C.4 with L(w, x, y) = min
yw T x rob , f 1 (g) = 1(g ≤ 0) and f γ 2 (h) = sup |g−h|<2γ
,
We note that for the 2 ball B 2 (x, ) = {x : x − x 2 ≤ }, we have
Therefore, we can design the following algorithm-Algorithm 2.
D Extra Experimental Results
In this section, we provide extra experimental results to verify the effectiveness of our proposed method TRADES. Solve the minimax optimization problem:
L k (w * k , x 1:n , y 1:n ) = min . The experimental setup is the same as TRADES, which is specified in the beginning of Section 5. For example, we use the same batch size and learning rate for all the methods. More specifically, we find that using one-step adversarial perturbation method like FGSM in the regularization term, defined in [KGB17] , cannot defend against FGSM k (white-box) attack. Therefore, we use FGSM k with the cross-entropy loss to calculate the adversarial example X in the regularization term, and the perturbation step size η 1 and number of iterations K are the same as in the beginning of Section 5. As for defense models in Table 5 , we implement the 'TRADES' models, the models trained by using other regularization losses in [KGB17, RDV17, ZSLG16], and the defense model 'Madry' in the antepenultimate line of Table 5 . We evaluate [WSMK18]'s model based on the checkpoint provided by the authors. The rest of the models in Table 5 are reported in [ACW18] .
D.2 Extra attack results in Section 5.3.1
Extra white-box attack results are provided in Table 8 . Extra black-box attack results are provided in Table 9 and Table 10 . We apply black-box FGSM attack on the MNIST dataset and the CIFAR10 dataset. 
D.5 Interpretability of the robust models trained by TRADES
In this section, we show that models trained by TRADES have strong interpretability.
D.5.1 Adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets
We show adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR10. We apply foolbox 3 [RBB17] to generate adversarial examples, which is able to return the smallest adversarial perturbations under the ∞ -norm distance.
The adversarial examples are generated by using FGSM k (white-box) attack on the models described in Section 5, including Natural models, Madry's models and TRADES models. Note that the FGSM k attack is foolbox.attacks.LinfinityBasicIterativeAttack in foolbox. See Figure 5 and Figure 6 for the adversarial examples of different models on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
D.5.2 Adversarial examples on Bird-or-Bicycle dataset
We find that the robust models trained by TRADES have strong interpretability. To see this, we apply a (spatial-tranformation-invariant) variant of TRADES to train ResNet-50 models in response to the unrestricted adversarial examples in the Bird-or-Bicycle competition [BCZ + 18]. The dataset in the competition is Bird-or-Bicycle, which consists of 30,000 pixel-224 × 224 images with label either 'bird' or 'bicycle'. The unrestricted threat models include structural perturbations, rotations, translations, resizing, 17+ common corruptions, etc. Please refer to [BCZ + 18] for more detailed setup of the competition. We show in Figures 7 and 8 the adversarial examples by the boundary attack with random spatial transformation on our robust model trained by the variant of TRADES. The boundary attack [BRB18] is a black-box attack method which searches for data points near the decision boundary and attack robust models by these data points. Therefore, the adversarial images obtained by boundary attack characterize the images around the decision boundary of robust models. We attack our model by boundary attack with random spatial transformations, a baseline in the competition. The classification accuracy on the adversarial test data is as high as 95% (at 80% coverage), even though the adversarial corruptions are perceptible to human. We observe that the robust model trained by TRADES has strong interpretability: in Figure 7 Figure 6 : Adversarial examples on CIFAR10 dataset. In each subfigure, the image in the first row is the original image and we list the corresponding correct label beneath the image. We show the perturbed images in the second row. The differences between the perturbed images and the original images, i.e., the perturbations, are shown in the third row. In each column, the perturbed image and the perturbation are generated by FGSM k (white-box) attack on the model listed below. The labels beneath the perturbed images are the predictions of the corresponding models, which are different from the correct labels. We record the smallest perturbations in terms of ∞ norm that make the models predict a wrong label (best viewed in color). 
